Articles

Do hedge funds with above average fees really outperform?

Received: 10.04.2023 Published: 15.03.2023

EDN: JKOVPK DOI: 10.22394/2070-8378-2023-25-2-61-74

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Abstract

In this research paper the question ‘Do hedge funds with a high incentive fee really outperform hedge funds with a below average or low incentive fee?’ is answered by carrying out author’s own regression on historical data and the variables that may explain the outcomes in this question. The author also considers academic researches to support the findings and add additional explanations to the outcome. Aside from testing whether hedge funds with high incentive and management fees really outperform the hedge funds with low incentive and management fees, the author also assesses whether they will offer better diversification benefits in times of need by looking at the correlation during a crisis period. In order to come to the article’s conclusion, the author answers the following questions: what relation does the fee-structure have to absolute returns, what relation does the fee-structure have to risk-adjusted returns, does paying higher fees mean better diversification benefits. This topic is relevant since many investors started questioning the benefit of investing their money in hedge funds because of poor performance of the hedge fund industry.

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Received: 10 April 2023

How to cite

Для цитирования:

Филатов Н.С. Имеют ли хедж-фонды с высокими комиссиями лучшие показатели? // Государственная служба. 2023. Т. 25, № 2. С. 61–74. https://doi.org/10.22394/2070-8378-2023-25-2-61-74

For citation:

Filatov N.S. Do hedge funds with above average fees really outperform? // Gosudarstvennaya Sluzhba. 2023. Vol. 25, no. 2. P. 61–74. https://doi.org/10.22394/2070-8378-2023-25-2-61-74

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How to Cite

Filatov N.S. Do hedge funds with above average fees really outperform? // Gosudarstvennaya Sluzhba. 2023. Vol. 25, no. 2. P. 61–74. https://doi.org/10.22394/2070-8378-2023-25-2-61-74

Коды статьи

  • EDN JKOVPK
  • Тип статьи (РИНЦ) Научная статья (Научная статья)

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