The article analyzes the role of activity and freedom in the formation and self-determination of the individual. A newunderstanding of the content of freedom, justified by Axel Honneth, is the unity and interdependence of its three components: negative,reflective and social. The authors consider activity as the most important condition for the development of personality and its self-determination, as well as a prerequisite for the emergence of social freedom (and freedom as such). The paper notes that full-fledgedactivity is possible only within the framework of the institutional system, where the potential of social freedom has already been realizedenough for people to carry out their chosen activity. The significance of the activity for the individual is determined, the dialectic ofrelations between the state, society and the individual is revealed. Moreover, all the efforts of the authorities should be directed, first ofall, to support the development of the potential of the individual in the chosen field of activity. Public policy should facilitate the supportof individuals in institutional areas; provide the opportunity for self-determination of the individual, its self-realization and recognition atvarious levels. This implies the priority of reasonable interests of the individual (excluding arbitrariness) before the interests of the state.To substantiate this thesis, the judgments of I. Kant, set out in his work ‘To the eternal world', as well as the statements of the founderof Russian pedagogy K. D. Ushinsky about the relationship of purpose and means in social organisms from his work ‘Anthropology',are involved.
