LIPCHANSKAYA MARIA ALEXANDROVNA

The article examines the meaning of digital rights in the constitutional and legal aspects. The author criticizes the concept of digital rights as new objects of civil rights in domestic civil legislation since it contradicts the established world practice in understanding such a term as “digital rights”, as well erroneously ascribes certain powers of other subjective rights as independent ones, which can be realized through digital technologies. The article considers the incorrect assignment to digital rights of some constitutional rights, enshrined in the Russian constitution (rights to information, the right to privacy, freedom of the media). According to the author, digital rights in the constitutional and legal framework should be considered only those that either appeared along with the emergence of modern digital technologies, or acquired a significantly new meaning. The article gives some examples of such rights (the right to Internet access; the right to communication; the right to protection from machine processing of information) and states the conclusion on the formation of a constitutional and legal institution of digital rights at the present time.